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Introduction
Since 2009 the price for emission allowances of the EU emissions trading system (ETS) has faced a massive drop. De Perthuis and Trotignon (2014) identify three main reasons for it. First, they point at an oversupply of allowances caused by the possibility to credit emission reductions outside the EU towards the EU ETS. Second, they nd lower demand on allowances induced by overlapping regulations (e.g. promotion of renewable energy). Third, they identify the economic crisis of 2008 which aected demand, too. The persistent price drop has led to doubts whether the EU ETS is able to set sucient incentives for investments in emission abatement (De Perthuis and Trotignon, 2014) .
There is a number of studies assessing the success of the EU ETS with respect to CO 2 reduction (see Laing et al., 2013, for an overview) . Most studies compare reported emissions with a counterfactual scenario without ETS (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008; Ellerman et al., 2010; Anderson and Di Maria, 2011; Egenhofer et al., 2011) . These studies project (limited) data before introduction of the ETS to the future to construct the counterfactual scenario. In contrast, Widerberg and Wråke (2011) carry out an empirical analysis based on data for the Swedish electricity sector to identify the drivers of changes in emission intensity. Other authors focus on certain ETS-induced eects as fuel switching (Delarue et al., 2008) or innovation (Rogge et al., 2011) to explain emission changes.
We use an approach similar to the work of Widerberg and Wråke (2011) based on annual data of the German electricity sector. In contrast to their results for Sweden we nd a signicant impact of the allowance price on emission intensity in the German electricity sector. However, the time trend is the strongest driver of emission reduction. We nd an ETS-induced emission reduction which is not exceeding 6 % of total emissions with a maximum in 2010. Thereafter the ETS has not induced additional reductions in the German electricity sector at all. The observed emission reduction in the German electricity sector has not complied with expectations. These ndings are the starting point to consider an adjustment of the EU ETS with respect to the three main causes for price erosion identied by De Perthuis and Trotignon (2014) .
Price erosion by supply-side eects is an issue of simple direct regulation. Indeed the EU has limited the possibility to credit emission reductions outside the EU towards the EU ETS starting from 2013 (European Commission, 2013a) . In this chapter we analyze the possibility to eliminate price erosion from demand-side eects (e.g. overlapping regulations, business cycles) by stating emission targets in relation to output or GDP instead of an absolute cap. In the literature such targets are mainly known as rate-based, intensity-based or indexed. Fisher (2003) and Holland (2012) point out that a purely output-related emission objective means a subsidy for output. Companies with lower emissions than the intensity standard print allowances with each output unit they produce. According to Sue Wing et al. (2009) , this critique does not apply on an aggregated level. Furthermore, it does not apply to the model described below because we will suggest an output-related emission objective only in addition to the absolute cap for its ex-post adjustment. Quirion (2005) ; Newell and Pizer (2008) develop models to evaluate intensity-based emission objectives. Both papers are based on the seminal work of Weitzman (1974) . Quirion (2005) nds little justication for an indexed regulation since a tax-based regulation is very likely to be superior. Newell and Pizer (2008) point out that a tax is often unfeasible. Thus, the decision usually is up to absolute quantities or intensity-based quantities. This corresponds to the situation of the EU ETS. Newell and Pizer (2008) derive a mechanism to nd out which of these two options is more eective. Sue Wing et al. (2009) set up a similar approach based on Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003) which, for simplicity, neglects marginal damage and focuses on cost minimization only.
Applying the methods suggested by Newell and Pizer (2008) and Sue Wing et al. (2009) to data of the German electricity market provides a clear result. An intensity-based emission cap is preferred to an absolute cap in recent years. However, an intensitybased emission cap cannot guarantee to reach an absolute objective (Rathmann, 2007) .
Thus, we suggest a combination of absolute and intensity-based cap. The intensitybased cap is used to adjust the absolute cap only for lower electricity generation than expected. An adjustment for unexpected high electricity generation is not necessary because the EU ETS already provides mechanisms with regard to a limitation of the certicate price (European Parliament and Council of the EU, 2009). The result of our approach is a unilateral exible cap which eliminates demand side eects by an automatic reduction of certicates.
The EU, in contrast to our approach, in 2015 introduced the so-called market stability reserve which intended a delayed auctioning of excessive allowances (European Parliament and Council, 2015) . Nevertheless, prices did not signicantly recover. Only after the agreement between the European Parliament and the Estonian presidency of the Council of the EU on November 9, 2017 allowance prices have signicantly recovered. In contrast to the 2015 decision of the European Commission more excessive certicates are absorbed by the market stability reserve and the reduction objectives for post 2020 have been exacerbated. The most important change was probably, that excessive allowances above a certain threshold value will be deleted from the reserve.
The advantage of our approach is that it follows a clear and predictive mechanism while the EU regulation is vulnerable to lobbying. This particularly applies for the threshold value kept in the market stability reserve and the speed excessive allowances are collected. Both were already changed between (European Parliament and Council, 2015 European Parliament and Council of the EU, 2018) . The threshold value also weakens the eectiveness of the procedure because demand side eects still have a signicant impact. Moreover, the deletion of allowances at the end of 2023 is a single event so far. The decision was made under great diculties in a lengthy process which took almost four years. Described deciencies are avoided with the suggested unilateral exible cap.
As basis for the following analysis we briey describe the functioning of the EU ETS with a focus on the German electricity sector in the next section. In Section 3 we develop an easy empirical model to evaluate the emission reduction induced by the EU ETS. The eectiveness of an intensity-based emission cap is evaluated in Section 4.
Moreover, we introduce the unilateral exible cap and discuss its impact on emission reduction.
The EU ETS in the German electricity sector
For the rst two trading periods of the EU ETS, National Allocation Plans (NAPs) were developed in each participating country. These plans specied, in the context of existing commitments, the national emissions budget (macro plan) and the allocation of allowances (micro plan). The NAPs had to be approved by the European Commis- Another innovation in the second trading period was the introduction of the Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). These mechanisms allow to count credits, so-called Certied Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), for emission reduction carried out in developing and emerging countries towards emissions in the EU ETS. CERs and ERUs which were issued during the second trading period could be exchanged to allowances of the EU ETS until March 31, 2015 (European Commission, 2013b . Until April 30, 2015 1.445 billion international credits were used in the EU ETS or exchanged to allowances valid in the EU ETS. It is expected that the EU-wide number of CERs and ERUs continues to increase until the end of the third trading period up to 1.6 billion certicates (European Commission, 2015, annex 1, p. 17) . In addition a substantial surplus of allowances occurred caused by the last nancial and economic crisis, which 1 In Section 3 we nd for the German electricity sector a non-ETS-induced decrease of 0.5 % in output-related emission intensity (ratio of emissions and electricity output).
2 The total amount of 456.1 million certicates is reduced by 125 million certicates which are allocated to the industrial sector while 20 million allowances were reserved for new facilities. amounts to 650 million certicates all over Europe (Neuho and Schopp, 2013) .
Already by these two eects, the surplus of emission allowances can be expected to exceed the total anticipated emission reduction for the third trading period which amounts to about two billion tons (European Commission, 2012a) 3 CO 2 reduction in the German electricity sector
In a rst step of our analysis we recall possible mitigation strategies on the side of electricity supply to nd a suitable indicator for emission reduction induced by the ETS. On the one hand generators can substitute emission-intensive energy sources by less emission-intensive sources (substitution strategy). Switching electricity generation for instance from coal to gas reduces emissions. On the other hand emission reduction without fuel switching always requires lower fuel input per generated electricity output (eciency strategy) because CO 2 reduction by carbon capturing and storage (CCS) is not competitive in electricity generation (Schröder et al., 2013) . Progress in research and development or the use of waste heat can for example bring eciency gains.
In addition to these two general strategies for emission reduction CO 2 is sensitive to demand side eects. If the allowance price leads to higher electricity prices it has an impact on demand. Nevertheless, an optimal abatement means preferably low costs. Other eects as business cycles and weather also inuence demand and thus emissions but they are independent of the ETS. Therefore, it is expedient to use an indicator which considers emission reduction of the supply side while it neglects the demand side. Using the emission factor which corresponds to emissions per electricity output (output-related emission intensity) instead of absolute emissions satises this condition.
In order to calculate the emission intensity for the German electricity sector we need to nd out emissions and electricity generation which is underlying the EU ETS. We can reasonably assume that all German fossil power plants underly the EU ETS (Schäfer, 2018) . Total emissions of the electricity sector are calculated based on data provided by Working Group on Energy Balances (2018b), Federal Environment Agency (2018) and Statistics of the Coal Sector (2018) (see Appendix A, Table 6 for results). Convery (2009) , the tone and tenor of the paper assumed that the decision to proceed and establish a Community wide emissions trading scheme had already been taken. The paper also mentioned the possibility to allocate certicates to participants based on historical emissions. Thus, it was apparent that the ETS would be introduced and that higher historical emissions could be an advantage with respect to allocation. This meant an incentive for generators to raise emissions in the hope of a more generous allocation of certicates during the rst trading period. Worth mentioning is that before introduction of the EU ETS there were no strict reporting obligations about emissions. less correspond to phases with low allowance prices (see Fig. 2 ). On the one hand incentives for emission reduction are anyway low under such conditions. On the other hand, based on the experience described above, high emissions might be a comfortable starting position for emitters to negotiate about the future design of the EU ETS.
Although the behavior of electricity generators described above, would have been rational and possible there is no proof for it. Nevertheless, these considerations about tactical behavior of market participants illustrate possible diculties to evaluate the impact of the EU ETS.
In addition there are several other overlapping eects complicating the analysis. There is for example a dierent time horizon for dierent mitigation measures. Fuel switching in general is possible in the short run while its extent is limited by installed generation and grid capacity. Therefore, high switching rates need more time. Furthermore, the ETS is not the only reason for emission reduction. Fuel prices also inuence the reduction of CO 2 . On the one hand the price ratio of coal and gas inuences the share of electricity generated from these sources. On the other hand high fuel prices increase incentives for emission reduction by higher eciency since it also means less expenses for fuel. Figure 3: Development of fuel prices for generation of one kWh electricity based on hard coal respectively gas. The solid lines reect pure fuel pricesp i,coal andp i,gas while the dashed lines also consider emission costs induced by the EU ETS yielding p i,coal and p i,gas . Prices also consider changes in the degree of eciency. Own calculations based on Working Group on Energy Balances (2018a),c and Statistics of the Coal Sector (2018) .
Taking into account the considerations above, we set up the following approach of a simple linear regression to explain emission intensities e i of each year i
with b as axis intercept, as error term and p i,ratio corresponding to the price ratio between coal and gas (p i,coal /p i,gas ).
Prices p i,coal and p i,gas consist of pure fuel pricesp i,coal andp i,gas plus a respective surcharge ∆p ets i,coal and ∆p ets i,gas stemming from the EU ETS. Fuel prices reect fuel costs per kilowatt hour generated electricity and thus consider dierent degrees of eciency for coal and gas power plants (see Appendix A for details). Hence, the price ratio p i,ratio considers fuel and allowance prices (see Fig. 3 ).
Since electricity generation faced a radical change after the German reunion in 1990 (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008) we restrain the regression to data beginning in the year 2000. Prices are calculated using data from Working Group on Energy Balances (2018a,c) and Statistics of the Coal Sector (2018) (see Appendix A, Table 6 for results).
Analysis of the counterfactual scenario without ETS
The results of the empirical analysis based on the linear regression according to Eq. 1 are given in Tables 1 and 2 According to the statistical analysis provided in Table 2 , in particular the time trend is decisive for the development of the emission intensity (â t >â p ). Nevertheless, both a t and a p lead to signicant results for the explanation of changes in emission intensities (see F -test provided in Table 1 and t-test provided in Table 2 ).
Emission costs induced by the EU ETS, change prices for electricity generation and are thus included in the ratio of prices p i,ratio . If emission costs are not considered (usingp i,ratio instead of p i,ratio )R 2 decreases to 0.764 which is even slightly lower than R 2 of a model neglecting a p (see Table 2 ). Table 2 : Statistical analysis of coecients a t , a p , b withâ as standardized coecients, s as standard error, t emp as empirical t-value, p(t emp ) as the respective probability of the t-value and R 2 as coecient of determination resulting from a correlation test for a i and a p separately.
A counterfactual scenario can be constructed using Eq. 1 with the calculated coecients a t and a p but neglecting the impact of the EU ETS on prices. That is using p i,ratio :=p i,coal /p i,gas instead of p i,ratio . Comparison of real emission intensities with the counterfactual intensities yields a rst approach for the impact of the EU ETS on intensities. On the one hand this approach may overestimate the eect of the EU ETS because all changes in intensities which are not explained by Eq. 1 are assigned to the EU ETS. On the other hand the eect of the EU ETS may be underestimated because we implicitly assume that the time trend is not aected by the ETS. However, so far allowance prices of the EU ETS were much lower than 30 e/t (see Fig. 2 3 In Fig. 4 the resulting counterfactual scenario and the real emission intensities are depicted. We see a decreasing trend for both the counterfactual scenario and measured emission intensities. Measured emission intensities are mainly below the counterfactual emission intensities which indicates reduced emissions by the EU ETS.
Calculation of emission abatement induced by the EU ETS
According to our empirical approach, the dierence between counterfactual and measured emission intensities corresponds to the estimated change of emission intensity 3 b is nevertheless always within its condence interval.
induced by the EU ETS. Results are given in Table 3 . Positive values indicate a reduction of emission intensity while negative values mean an increasing intensity (negative reduction). Although at rst sight it might seem absurd that the ETS could lead to higher emission intensity it cannot be excluded for all years of observation. Lobbying and tactical behavior might incentivize higher emission intensities to convince the regulator of a less strict cap in the future. Since we cannot estimate the eect of tactical behavior we put negative values into brackets (see Table 3 ). The product of intensity change and ETS-inuenced electricity generation S ets,i of the respective year i (see Appendix A, Table 5 ) yields an estimate for the change in emissions which is automatically corrected for demand side eects (see Table 3 ). Table 3 : CO 2 and intensity reduction in the German electricity sector induced by the ETS. Negative values (in brackets) mean an intensity respectively CO 2 increase compared to the counterfactual scenario. This might happen due to tactical behavior. The revised German NAP for the second trading period intended, with respect to the electricity sector, an overall average emission reduction of around 14 % at the minimum when compared to the base period (see Section 2 for details). According to data from Working Group on Energy Balances (2018b), Federal Environment Agency (2018) , Statistics of the Coal Sector (2018) the average emission reduction was only 5.9 % (see Schäfer, 2018) . Neglecting demand side eects and thus looking at emission intensities instead yields an average reduction of 8.2 % for the second trading period when compared to the average of the base period (see Table 5 in Appendix A). The EU ETS contributed a decrease between 1.2 % (lower limit) and 4.6 % (upper limit).
For the rst three years of the third trading period emission intensity is only reduced by 7.8 % in comparison to the base period which means an increase of 0.4 % when compared to the average of the second trading period. The European Commission instead intended, starting from 2010, an emission reduction over all sectors of annually 1.74 % with respect to the average of the second trading period (see Section 2).
The promotion of RES which was carried out simultaneously to the EU ETS, led to a signicantly higher decrease in emissions. According to Schäfer (2018) First, a time lag of three years seems more adequate because of the good data situation in Germany. Second, we do not assess emissions of the electricity sector in relation to GDP but in relation to its output in the sphere of the EU ETS.
4 That is we use the emission factor as intensity-based quantity. This allows the necessary calculation of ξ = ν(Sets) ν(E)ρ ES which is the decisive parameter of our analysis. ν(S ets ) and ν(E) are the variation coecients of emissions E and electricity output in the sphere of the EU ETS S ets . ρ ES is their correlation (see Fig. 6 for results). Under the described use of data (ten years, time lag of three years) the approach of Newell and Pizer (2008) delivers the same results within the accuracy of one decimal digit. This is not surprising since marginal damage of emissions with respect to annual data is almost at (Newell and Pizer, 2003) . For ξ < 2 an intensity-based cap is superior to an absolute cap while the opposite is true for ξ > 2. According to Newell and Pizer (2008) , values between 1 and 2 mean an over-adjustment by an intensitybased regulation while values below 1 indicate under-adjustment when compared to the optimum.
As discussed in Section 3 Germany faced major transitions after its reunion in the 1990s. Estimates for ξ which are based on data before 2000 should be treated with caution. The calculations show a decrease of ξ and at least since 2012 a high preference of intensity-based quantities over absolute quantities for electricity generation in Germany (see Fig. 6 ). Since results may be dierent in non-electricity sectors intensity-based quantities may be applied for electricity generation only. Schmidt 4 As discussed in Section 3 we subtract electricity generation by nuclear power plants and promoted RES from total electricity output to receive electricity generation in the sphere of the EU ETS. et al. (2008) for example also suggest a sectoral approach for an ETS whereas they investigate the interaction between developing and industrialized countries.
Introduction of a unilateral exible cap
Setting a reasonable objective of absolute emission reduction for year i means to implicitly consider a certain expectation about the electricity output S e ets,i which is in the sphere of the EU ETS (see for example European Commission, 2006 ). This objective is translated into a maximal number of allowances E i . Thus, ex-ante there is a xed relation between the absolute number of allowances E i and the corresponding emission intensity e i as respective intensity-based objective
Demand side eects as for example the promotion of renewable energy or business cycles may lead to a deviation of actual ETS-aected electricity generation S ets,i from the expected level
This has an eect on absolute emissions while it does not aect the emission factor e i . The emission intensity can thus be used to calculate the dierence in emission certicates arising from the deviation of expected electricity generation
An intensity-based cap corrects demand side eects. However, in contrast to an absolute cap, it shows uncertainty to reach an absolute objective. This disadvantage is avoided if an intensity-based cap is dened as secondary objective in addition to an absolute cap which serves as primary objective. The primary objective eectuates that emissions are lower or equal to the number of certicates E i . The secondary objective (emission intensity should be lower or equal to e i ) is respected only if the primary objective is fullled. This means the intensity-based cap is only binding if electricity generation is lower than expected. For an electricity generation above expectation there is no adjustment. The result is a unilateral exible cap.
There are several reasons which argue for the suggested combination of absolute and intensity-based emission cap. On the one hand there is a broad agreement to limit global warming to a maximum of 2 • C of the preindustrial temperature level which requires an absolute cap in emissions. Some authors see the two degrees as threshold value whose excess leads to catastrophe (see Jaeger and Jaeger, 2011 , for an overview).
Despite all critique the two degrees are certainly the most prominent lowest common denominator in international climate policy. This is already a high value in itself (Jaeger and Jaeger, 2011 ).
On the other hand an intensity-based emission cap increases the security of investments in emission reduction because it decouples the EU ETS from demand side eects. This keeps the pressure on emission reduction which points into the same direction like UK's carbon price oor.
5 An intensity-based emission cap also avoids eciency losses if RES are promoted simultaneously to the EU ETS. The unilaterality of the exible cap is a desired feature because the EU ETS already provides mechanisms to limit the certicate price in case of a scarcity of certicates (European Parliament and Council of the EU, 2009). In addition there is still the possibility to count international credits (CERs, ERUs) towards emissions of the EU ETS which counteracts high prices.
The idea of a unilateral exible cap is to subtract the amount of excessive emission certicates, which occurred in year i from the intended amount of certicates to be auctioned in year i + 1. In contrast, if in year i there is a higher electricity generation than expected yielding to a scarcity of emission certicates, the number of missing certicates will be balanced, only if there have been excessive certicates before year i or there will be excessive certicates after year i within the same trading period. The unilateral exible cap has similarities to the dual-intensity targets suggested by Kim and Baumert (2002) .
These considerations yield an adjusted number of certicates
with
and
i start is the rst year the unilateral exible cap is applied. R i is a reserve which is fed by excessive allowances. There are similarities to the general idea of the market stability reserve which was introduced by the European Parliament and Council (2015) .
However, the mechanism how certicates enter the reserve and how they are deleted 5 UK introduced a carbon price oor to guarantee a minimum price for emissions. The carbon price oor consists of the allowance price of the EU ETS plus a variable surcharge which in total yields the minimum price.
is dierent
It is important to note, that the adjustment takes place according to a predetermined and therefore, predictable mechanism for market participants. Production declines are made neutral to allowance prices regardless if they are caused by economic development, the use of additional renewable energy or a warm winter. The uctuations of the certicate price are expected to weaken signicantly reducing uncertainty for investments in CO 2 abatement accordingly. This should lead to a stabilization of investment activities.
Ex-post evaluation of the impact of a unilateral exible cap
After the theoretical considerations in the preceding section we want to evaluate the impact of the suggested unilateral emission cap on the number of allowances. Since the rst trading period was seen as trial period (e.g. Kollmuss et al., 2010, p. 68) we assume the unilateral emission cap was introduced before the start of the second trading period in 2008. This allows to carry out an ex-post-analysis to nd out how the number of allowances would have developed if a unilateral exible emission cap had been introduced.
As discussed in Section 4.1 emission intensity serves as suitable intensity-based cap.
According to Eq. 2, emission intensity is the ratio between the number of allowances in the electricity sector and expected electricity generation in the sphere of the EU ETS (S e ets,i ). We need reliable data for both the number of allowances and the expected electricity generation before the start of the second trading period to evaluate the eect of a unilateral exible cap ex post.
The number of allowances was determined in NAPs (see Section 2 for details). There are two peculiarities which need to be considered for Germany. First, the revised German NAP planned a reserve for market entries of new installations while the nal shut down of installations should reduce the number of allowances (Federal Ministry for the Environment, 2007) . The planned number of certicates does therefore not exactly correspond to issued (auctioned and freely allocated) allowances. Second, the German NAP planned free allocation of certicates for the ETS-underlying industry while necessary certicates for the power sector were partially auctioned o. Considering these eects the intended CO 2 budget for the power sector can be determined by subtracting freely allocated allowances for the industry from the total number of issued certicates using data from European Environment Agency (2018) .
The power sector does not only consist of electricity generation but also includes thermal power plants for district heating. In 2005, which served as reference year for the determination of the emission cap of the second trading period (European Commission, 2006) , the emission share of electricity generation on the power sector was about 0.9 (see Schäfer, 2018) . Thus, we assume this share to calculate the emission budget of electricity generation from the CO 2 budget of the complete power sector.
In the third trading period there are no national budgets anymore. Since the EU-wide emission cap is derived from the average of allowances in the second trading period we can calculate a respective theoretical budget for the third trading period according to the same mechanism (see last paragraph in Section 2). The results are given in Table   4 . Table 4 : Ex-post evaluation of the EU ETS assuming a unilateral cap for the German electricity sector as described in Section 4. E i corresponds to the emission budget of the ETS which is calculated based on European Environment Agency (2018) , Schäfer (2018 ), European Commission (2010 . The expected electricity generation S e ets,i is calculated on the basis of Mantzos (2006), Capros et al. (2010) , Working Group on Energy Balances (2018b). The ratio of E i and S e ets,i yields the emission intensity e i while the actual electricity generation in the sphere of the ETS S ets,i is based on Working Group on Energy Balances (2018b), Information Platform of the German Transmission System Operators (2018) . The deviation from expected electricity generation ∆S ets,i , the dierence in allowances ∆E i , the reserve R i and the adjusted number of allowancesẼ i are calculated according to Eq. 3 5.
The European Commission rejected the German NAP for the second trading period because assumptions about economic growth and technological potential for emission reduction were not considered (European Commission, 2006) . In this context the Commission pointed to the PRIMES model (Capros and Mantzos, 2006) as the most accurate and reliable estimations of both GDP growth and carbon intensity improvement rates (European Commission, 2006, p. 5) . The Commission considered 2010 to constitute a representative average of the relevant ve-year period from 2008 to 2012 (European Commission, 2006, p. 5 According to Capros and Mantzos (2006) , thermal-based electricity generation (including biomass) in Germany should increase by 5.8 % 6 from 2005 until 2010. In the same period electricity generation from wind and hydro power plants was expected to increase by almost 50 % while a decrease of electricity from nuclear power plants was expected which reects the German decision about the nuclear phase-out.
As discussed in Section 3 total electricity generation minus electricity which is generated by nuclear power plants and subsidized RES corresponds to total electricity output which may be aected by the ETS. Table 4 ). Table 4 ).
The application of a unilateral exible cap instead of an absolute cap would have reduced the number of emission allowances for the second trading period by 104.7 Mt.
That corresponds to 7.7 % of totally issued certicates for the German electricity sector (see Table 4 ). Neuho and Schopp (2013) estimate excessive allowances caused by the nancial and economic crisis to 650 million within the EU. This corresponds, according to European Environment Agency (2018) , to 6.2 % of totally issued certicates in trading period two. Assuming a similar impact of the crisis among the EU this suggests a signicant reduction of excessive allowances by the unilateral exible cap in Germany. 6 390,045/368,682=1.0579 (Capros and Mantzos, 2006, p. 102) 7 An alternative approach would be to include only electricity generated by power plants which are underlying the ETS. 8 414,780/422,310=0.9822 (Capros et al., 2010, p. 87) Nevertheless, the impact of a unilateral exible cap on the EU-level is left open for further research since our analysis is restricted to the German electricity sector.
Conclusions
We analyze data from the German electricity sector with a simple statistical model. This allows to estimate the success of the EU ETS in terms of emission reduction.
Results show that ETS-induced CO 2 mitigation has been relatively low so far. The There is a broad consensus that the detected limited success of the EU ETS has been caused by excessive allowances. While there are easy possibilities to limit excessive allowances on the supply side by simple direct regulation (see e.g. European Commission, 2012b) this does not apply for the demand side. We develop a mechanism which uses an intensity-based cap in addition to the absolute cap to tackle this problem.
In a rst step we study the performance of an intensity-based emission cap applying data of the German electricity market to the (similar) theories of Newell and Pizer (2008) and Sue Wing et al. (2009) . Results show the superiority of an intensitybased cap when compared to an absolute cap. In combination with an absolute cap the compliance to objectives of absolute emission reduction is guaranteed, too. The intensity-based cap is thus used to induce a reduction of allowances in the event of excessive allowances while it will not lead to an increase of allowances. The resulting unilateral exible cap eliminates excessive allowances because of demand side eects.
The suggested cap absorbs for instance the impact of a promotion of RES on the EU ETS. This is a decisive step to decouple the promotion of RES and the ETS which are overlapping regulations.
In an ex-post analysis we study the impact of a unilateral exible cap assuming it would have been introduced to the German electricity sector before the start of the second trading period. According to our model, the regulator states an intensity- (2018) we can assume that all fossil-based power plants are underlying the EU ETS.
The annual electricity output specied by source is provided by Working Group on Energy Balances (2018b). Information about electricity which is generated by subsidized RES is available at Information Platform of the German Transmission System
Operators (2018) and Wagner (2000) . This allows to calculate the electricity output S ets,i which is in the sphere of the EU ETS. 9 The emission intensity e i is the ratio of E i and S ets,i (see Table 5 for data and calculations).
year i E Fuel prices are taken from Statistics of the Coal Sector (2018) . The degree of eciency 9 The electricity output in the sphere of the EU ETS corresponds to the gross electricity output minus nuclear-based electricity generation and electricity from subsidized RES.
can be calculated dividing generated electricity given in Working Group on Energy Balances (2018b) by used primary energy given in Working Group on Energy Balances (2018a). This allows to calculate averaged fuel prices per generated kilowatt hour.
The price for emission allowances for 2005 is, due to lack of other data, until the middle of September based on forward prices. Afterwards the average price of the respective December Futures of the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) are used (German Emissions Trading Authority, 2009 Authority, , 2013 Intercontinental Exchange, 2018) . Considering the specic emission intensities and eciency of coal-red and gas-red power plants emission costs per generated kilowatt hour can be calculated (see Table 6 ). (2018) 
